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Setting the Agenda or Responding to
Voters? Political Parties, Voters and
Issue Attention
HEIKE KLÜVER and IÑAKI SAGARZAZU
Why do political parties prioritise some policy issues over others? While the issue own-
ership theory suggests that parties emphasise policy issues on which they have an
advantage in order to increase the salience of these issues among voters, the riding the
wave theory argues instead that parties respond to voters by highlighting policy issues
that are salient in the minds of citizens. This study sheds new light on the selective issue
emphasis of political parties by analysing issue attention throughout the entire electoral
cycle. On the basis of a quantitative text analysis of more than 40,000 press releases
published by German parties from 2000 until 2010, this article provides empirical
support for the riding the wave theory. It shows that political parties take their cues
from voters by responding to the issue priorities of their electorate. The results have
important implications for political representation and the role that parties play in
democracies.
Keywords: issue attention; political parties press; releases; quantitative text analysis;
representation
The idea of party competition through selective emphasis of policy issues has
long been discussed in the literature on party competition (Budge and Farlie
1983; Petrocik 1996; Robertson 1976). The general idea is that political parties
compete for votes by strategically emphasising some policy issues while down-
playing others. Political parties spend a great deal of time and effort on care-
fully selecting what issues to talk about. Accordingly, the issue agenda of
political parties has been the subject of numerous studies investigating what
political issues parties talk about (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Green-Pedersen
2007; van de Wardt et al. 2014), why new policy issues emerge (e.g. Adams
1997; Hobolt and de Vries 2015; Spoon and Klüver 2014) and whether politi-
cal debate is characterised by issue convergence or divergence (e.g. Damore
2005; Sigelman and Buell 2004).
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While scholars largely agree that selective issue emphasis is an important
instrument of party competition, there is still disagreement about why some
issues are prioritised over others. There are essentially two major theories that
seek to explain why political parties devote attention to some issues, but not to
others. Issue ownership theory argues that political parties emphasise policy
issues on which they are considered to be competent (Budge and Farlie 1983;
Petrocik 1996). By raising the public salience of the issues that they ‘own’,
political parties try to steer public debate towards issues on which they have a
competitive advantage over their opponents. By contrast, the riding the wave
theory argues that issue competition is instead a bottom-up process in which
political parties respond to the issue priorities of citizens (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1994). In this line of reasoning, political parties are responsive to their
electorate by strategically emphasising policy issues that are currently salient
in the minds of voters to reap electoral gains.
The empirical evidence regarding the competing issue ownership and riding
the wave theories is however inconclusive. While some studies show that issue
ownership inﬂuences what political parties talk about (e.g. Budge and Farlie
1983; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003; Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002), others
demonstrate that parties respond to the policy priorities of their voters (e.g.
Klüver and Spoon 2014; Spoon and Klüver 2014; Wagner and Meyer 2014).
In addition, the vast majority of studies investigating selective issue emphasis
of political parties focuses on political communication in the United States
(e.g. Damore 2005; Petrocik 1996; Sides 2007; Sigelman and Buell 2004;
Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002).
While these studies shed important light on how campaign dynamics work
in a two-party system, multi-party systems work quite differently. In two-party
systems, one party is in government while the other is in opposition so that
these parties directly oppose each other without the need to compromise. By
contrast, political parties in multi-party systems typically face the need to form
coalitions with at least one other party so that party competition between
potential coalition partners might be less intense than between parties in a two-
party system (see e.g. Müller and Strøm 2000). As a result, one could expect
that the riding the wave theory might better explain parties’ selective issue
emphasis in multi-party systems as parties could settle on policy issues that are
salient to the electorate while the issue ownership theory might be more suit-
able to explain the ﬁerce competition between parties in a two-party system
where each party is solely interested in maximising its own electoral beneﬁts.
What is more, previous research almost exclusively focused on issue competi-
tion in election campaigns (Damore 2005; Hayes 2008; Klüver and Spoon
2014; Sides 2007; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002;
Spoon and Klüver 2014; Wagner and Meyer 2014). Election campaigns are
very different from the day-to-day politics during the legislative term as they
only cover a short period of heated political competition. We therefore know
very little about how the dynamics of political dialogue work in ‘normal’ times
of party competition.
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To better understand how parties choose the issues they talk about, this
paper makes two major contributions to the literature. First, we provide a com-
prehensive analysis of political communication strategies of political parties
embedded in a multi-party system. Second and more importantly, we rely on a
novel dataset that was generated based on a quantitative text analysis of more
than 40,000 press releases published by German political parties between 2000
and 2010 which allows for analysing issue competition throughout the entire
electoral cycle. Press releases constitute an ideal instrument of political com-
munication as political parties can independently choose what to communicate
to their voters on a daily basis (see also Grimmer 2010; Hopmann et al. 2012;
Sagarzazu and Klüver 2015). Unlike speeches or questions in the legislature
which are constrained by the parliamentary agenda, political parties can freely
decide which political issues they want to emphasise. Unlike party manifestos
which are only published for elections and therefore only available for a few
points in time, political parties issue several press releases per day. By studying
press releases we are therefore able to shed light on the dynamics of political
communication and issue competition throughout the entire electoral cycle on
a day-to-day basis. Our results provide empirical evidence for the riding the
wave argument since we show that political parties take their cues from voters
while the expectations of the issue ownership theory could not be conﬁrmed.
Understanding why political parties prioritise certain issues over others has
important implications for our understanding of political representation and
party responsiveness. Political parties play an important function in modern
democracy as they are supposed to articulate and aggregate citizens’ prefer-
ences and thereby to link governmental policy with society (Dalton et al.
2011; Miller and Stokes 1963). Accordingly, recent studies started to explore
to what extent political parties respond to the issue priorities of citizens
(Klüver and Spoon 2014; Spoon and Klüver 2014, 2015; Wagner and Meyer
2014). While this research has signiﬁcantly advanced our understanding of the
relationship between parties and voters, these studies were solely limited to
studying parties’ selective issue emphasis during election campaigns by analys-
ing the content of their election manifestos. Our study therefore importantly
contributes to our understanding of political parties and democracy as we shed
light on the degree of party responsiveness throughout the entire legislative
cycle.
Explaining Parties’ Issue Attention
The literature on party competition has identiﬁed selective issue emphasis as
an important strategy of party competition. Scholars have argued that political
parties compete with each other by campaigning on different policy issues
rather than by opposing each other on the same issues (e.g. Budge and Farlie
1983; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Petrocik 1996). However, while the selective
issue emphasis has been recognised as an important strategy of party competi-
tion (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Robertson 1976), scholars
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disagree about why political parties choose the policy issues they talk about. It
is largely undisputed that issue competition matters, but there is still dissent
about why certain issues are prioritised over others. There are two major lines
of reasoning which arrive at competing predictions. First, the issue ownership
theory argues that political parties set the issue agenda by communicating on
policy issues on which they have an advantage to increase the salience of these
issues among voters in order to reap electoral gains (Petrocik 1996). Second,
the riding the wave theory instead posits that political parties primarily respond
to voters by highlighting political issues that are salient in the minds of citizens
to beneﬁt electorally from being responsive to the electorate (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1994).
Issue Ownership
Issue ownership theory argues that political parties can effectively ‘own’ differ-
ent issues (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). When a party owns an
issue, it is perceived by the electorate as having issue-speciﬁc policy expertise
and therefore being particularly competent at handling problems in that issue
area (Petrocik 1996). For instance, in the United States, Democrats are consid-
ered to own the issue of health care and Republicans are believed to own the
issue of national security (Petrocik 1996). In a similar vein, voters particularly
trust green parties when it comes to environmental protection (Budge et al.
1987).
According to the issue ownership model, political parties attempt to mobi-
lise voters by emphasising policy issues on which they enjoy a reputation of
competence. Voters make their vote choices by evaluating the competence of
political parties to handle certain policy issues. Issue ownership theory argues
that voters identify the party that is the most competent problem-solver on an
issue and cast the ballot for that party. For instance, if health care is the most
salient issue in a given US election, issue ownership theory suggests that vot-
ers would evaluate political parties with regard to their competence to solve
the health care problem. As the Democratic Party is generally considered to
have more expertise and competence to deal with health care in the US, issue
ownership theory predicts that voters would cast their vote for the Democrats
and not for the Republican Party in that election. However, it is moreover not
sufﬁcient that political parties are perceived as competent problem-solvers on
an issue, but the issue also needs to be salient to voters, as pointed out by
Bélanger and Meguid (2008).
Since voters support political parties on the basis of their competence to
deal with issues that are important to them, political parties attempt to increase
the salience of ‘their’ issues in the minds of citizens. Parties therefore try to
steer public attention towards their owned issues by emphasising policy issues
on which they are perceived to be competent while downplaying issues on
which opponents enjoy an advantage (Petrocik 1996). By highlighting their
4 H. Klüver and I. Sagarzazu
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own issues, political parties seek to increase the salience of beneﬁcial issues
among the electorate so that party evaluations on their owned issues shape
voter decisions at the ballot box. As a result, based on the issue ownership the-
ory we hypothesise that political parties will focus on their own issues to reap
electoral gains.
Hypothesis 1: Political parties pay more attention to political issues that
they own than to other political issues.
Riding the Wave
While the issue ownership theory considers political parties as agenda-setters
which selectively highlight their own issues to increase the salience of these
issues among voters, the riding the wave theory predicts the opposite. Instead
of conceiving issue competition as a top-down process in which voters take
cues from political parties, the riding the wave theory conceptualises issue
emphasis as a bottom-up process in which political parties respond to the issue
priorities of voters (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). It is argued that the most
effective strategies to win elections are those where politicians and parties
focus on the issues that are salient to the electorate regardless of who owns
those issues (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Fournier et al. 2003). By ‘riding
the wave’ on publicly salient issues that are timely and newsworthy, political
parties signal responsiveness to their voters. They can enhance their popularity
by demonstrating to their voters that they listen to them and that they take their
concerns seriously.
Accordingly, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994: 337) state that ‘by
advertising on the major issues of the day, candidates are more likely to be
seen as concerned, responsive and informed’. Similarly, Sides (2007: 467)
argues that ignoring the issues that are salient to the general public could lead
voters to perceive political parties to be ‘out of touch’ with citizens’ concerns
and worries. Damore (2004) furthermore shows that candidates even talk about
adversarial issues that are owned by their opponents if these issues are impor-
tant to the public. If policy issues are already salient in the minds of voters,
parties will adhere to these issues in order not to simply abdicate these issues
to their opponents. Finally, recent research analysing the content of party mani-
festos has similarly found evidence for the riding the wave argument. When
drafting their election platforms, political parties respond to the policy priorities
of citizens (Klüver and Spoon 2014; Spoon and Klüver 2014; Wagner and
Meyer 2014).
Hence, following the riding the wave theory, we hypothesise that political
parties ﬂexibly adjust their issue attention in response to voters’ policy priori-
ties. They emphasise policy issues that are important to voters while ignoring
issues that are of little concern to their electorate.
Hypothesis 2: The attention that political parties pay to policy issues
increases with the salience of these issues to voters.
Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? 5
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Research Design
In this section, we explain how we test the competing predictions of the issue
ownership and riding the wave theories. We ﬁrst explain why we have selected
Germany as a test case. We then discuss how we measured political parties’
issue attention before we illustrate the operationalisation of the explanatory and
control variables.
Political Parties in Germany
We have selected Germany as a test case for studying the determinants of par-
ties’ issue attention for several reasons. First, previous research has almost
exclusively analysed selective issue emphasis of political parties in the United
States (e.g. Damore 2005; Petrocik 1996; Sides 2007; Sigelman and Buell
2004; Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002). While these studies have made important
advances, the two-party system in the US works quite differently from multi-
party systems. In two-party systems, the electoral contest takes place between
two candidates of two major parties who compete for governmental ofﬁce. By
contrast, in multi-party systems there are multiple parties that are able to obtain
control over executive ofﬁce most often by forming a coalition government
with at least one other partner (see e.g. Müller and Strøm 2000). Second, we
selected the German multi-party system due to data availability considerations.
All parties included in the German Bundestag regularly issue press releases
which constitute an ideal source for measuring the attention that parties pay to
different policy issues, as we further outline below. Since the press releases of
all Bundestag parties are publicly available on their websites or in archives of
political foundations, we are able to trace the issue agenda of political parties
in Germany on a day-to-day basis.
Measuring Issue Attention
In order to analyse the attention that political parties in Germany pay to
different policy issues, we study the press releases published by their party
groups in the German Bundestag (see also Sagarzazu and Klüver 2015). Press
releases are an ideal data source to study the selective issue emphasis of politi-
cal parties as we can trace the attention that parties pay to different policy
issues on a daily basis, which constitutes a major advantage over election man-
ifestos which are only published in election years. We study press releases that
were published between 2000 until 2010. This time span allows for studying
selective issue emphasis across four legislative terms with three different gov-
ernment compositions (the SPD and the Greens from 1998 until 2005, a grand
coalition consisting of the CDU/CSU and SPD from 2005 until 2009 and a
coalition government between the CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP from 2009
onwards). However, we did not include the press releases published by the
6 H. Klüver and I. Sagarzazu
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socialist party for two reasons: First, the PDS (as it was then called) did not
pass the 5 per cent threshold and only gained two direct mandates in the 2002
election. As a result, it did not constitute a party group in the Bundestag.
Second, in the 2000 to 2010 period, the socialist party underwent considerable
changes. In 2005, it formed an electoral alliance with members of the newly
founded WASG running on PDS lists before both parties merged in 2007 and
formed the new socialist party ‘Die LINKE’. It furthermore has to be noted
that we were not able to analyse the press releases published by the CDU/CSU
in 2000 as these releases could not be provided by the party group or by the
associated party foundation. Table A.1 in the appendix shows the total number
of press releases published by German parties and Figure A.1 illustrates, for
each month, the average number of press releases per day published by each
of the four parties.
In order to classify the press releases into issue areas we use the Bayesian
expressed agenda model developed by Grimmer (2010).1 By using this unsu-
pervised quantitative text analysis approach we are able to automatically group
press releases into distinct issue categories based on word co-occurrences
within and across the different press releases included in our text corpus. The
central idea of this model is that the probability that two words from the same
issue area are mentioned in a given press release is higher than the probability
of two words from different issues co-occurring. For example, words such as
‘university’, ‘school’ or ‘teacher’ share a high probability of being mentioned
in a press release on education while words such as ‘military’, ‘army’ and
‘war’ have a high likelihood of occurring in press releases on defence policy.
We prepared our dataset by following standard procedures in order to con-
vert our raw data into a word frequency matrix required as input for the
expressed agenda model (e.g. Grimmer 2010; Grimmer and Stewart 2013).
These include removing stop words, deleting all party labels, stemming words
to their syntactical root and eliminating words present in more than 95 per cent
of texts or in less than 1.5 per cent. With the ﬁnal set of words we generate
the word frequency matrix which serves as input to the expressed agenda
model algorithm. In order to classify documents into issue areas, it is further-
more required to indicate the authors of the press releases (in this case the par-
ties) and the number of issues in which the texts should be classiﬁed. Similar
to other works in the discipline (Grimmer and Stewart 2013), we performed a
two-stage process to determine the number of issues. At the ﬁrst stage, we esti-
mated the model with a varying number of issues ranging from 15 to 35. At
stage two, we selected the ﬁnal model after assessing the validity of the differ-
ent topic groupings. We assessed the validity of the classiﬁcation in three
ways: ﬁrst by analysing the internal consistency of the topics; second, by com-
paring the issue classiﬁcation to the issue agenda of the German Bundestag;
and third, by comparing the automatic classiﬁcation with the classiﬁcation per-
formed by human coders.
First, we evaluated whether the press releases that were grouped into one
thematic category are internally consistent by analysing the key terms which
Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? 7
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TABLE 1
T IME - SER IES CROSS - SECT ION REGRESS ION ANALYS I S
DV: Party issue attention (t0) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory variables
Voter issue attention (t‒1) 0.025* 0.025* 0.025*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Competence attribution (ownership) 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Control variables
Opposition party 0.065 0.065 0.044
(0.366) (0.365) (0.212)
Manifesto issue salience 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041)
Gov’t/Opp’n issue attention (t‒1) 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Ministry control 0.022 0.021 0.045
(0.277) (0.278) (0.254)
No of months until national election −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
EP election −0.012 −0.007 −0.012
(0.313) (0.314) (0.313)
State election 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.212) (0.216) (0.214)
Unemployment (t‒1) −0.005 −0.001 −0.006
(0.084) (0.093) (0.082)
BSE crisis −0.003 −0.000 −0.011
(0.358) (0.366) (0.348)
CDU funding scandal 0.006 0.015 0.007
(0.239) (0.307) (0.238)
9/11 terrorist attack −0.041 −0.039 −0.033
(0.432) (0.440) (0.433)
Afghanistan war 0.008 0.004 0.007
(0.472) (0.478) (0.472)
Flood 0.001 0.009 0.002
(0.845) (0.816) (0.844)
World cup 0.014 0.001 0.016
(0.603) (0.675) (0.603)
Economic crisis −0.006 −0.013 −0.006
(0.140) (0.225) (0.139)
CDU/CSU‒SPD coalition 0.023
(0.257)
CDU/CSU‒FDP coalition 0.028
(0.428)
FDP 0.083
(0.784)
Greens 0.058
(0.492)
SPD −0.028
(0.340)
Party issue attention (t‒1) 0.555*** 0.555*** 0.555***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Constant 1.767 1.722 1.734
(0.947) (0.967) (0.960)
N 6,060 6,060 6,060
R2 0.470 0.470 0.470
F 49.449 53.411 45.815
LogLik −19,290.483 −19,290.478 −19,290.375
AIC 38,618.966 38,622.956 38,624.750
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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the expressed agenda model identiﬁed for assigning the texts to the different
issue areas. Table A.2 in the appendix summarises the (translated) top 10 key
terms for each of the 20 issue areas we identiﬁed. The key terms clearly
express a focus on the associated issue areas. For instance, the terms educa-
tion, university and research undoubtedly signal that press releases deal with
education and research policy. Similarly, the terms environment, nature conser-
vation and nuclear safety clearly indicate that a press release is about environ-
ment and nuclear safety policy while the terms international, usa and foreign
policy demonstrate a press statement’s focus on international politics.
Second, while the words grouped in each topic clearly point to the exis-
tence of common issue areas, the second step in assessing the validity of the
results is comparing the identiﬁed issue areas to what are considered to be the
main policy issues in German politics. For this external cross-validation, we
relied on the most important institutional structures that organise the issue
agenda in the German Bundestag, namely the permanent committees. When
we compare the 20 issue areas identiﬁed through the quantitative text analysis
with the committee portfolios (see Table A.3 in the appendix) we can perfectly
match 13 out of the 20 issue areas with a speciﬁc committee portfolio. Four
other issue areas map into two different committees, as some committees take
responsibility for more than one issue area. Given that some issue areas are
broader in scope than the committees in the Bundestag, we also ﬁnd that three
issue areas cover more than one committee’s policy remit. Finally, even though
there is no committee dealing with Länder issues, it is in fact evidence for the
validity of the text analysis that this issue was identiﬁed as it plays a crucial
role in German politics (Däubler and Debus 2009). In addition, out of the four
Bundestag committees which could not be linked to any text analysis issues,
two deal with procedural issues (Petitions and Scrutiny of Elections) and two
are related to minor policy areas (Sports and Tourism). All in all we are there-
fore conﬁdent that the issue areas identiﬁed by the text analysis have both
internal consistency and external validity.
Third, we compared the classiﬁcation by the expressed agenda model with
the classiﬁcation of press statements by human coders. Following Grimmer
and Stewart (2013), we obtained a stratiﬁed sample from the press releases text
corpus that included 10 press statements per thematic category. We then relied
on human coding to place the press releases into the 20 thematic categories.
Overall, there was an agreement of 75 per cent between the manual and the
automated classiﬁcation.
We measure the attention that political parties pay to policy issues by the
percentage of press releases devoted to each of the 20 issue areas out of the
total number of press releases published in a month. We analyse the issue
attention of political parties on a monthly basis in order to keep the dataset
manageable and since many of the independent variables are not available on a
daily level (e.g. the salience of issues to voters.)
Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? 9
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Measuring Explanatory and Control Variables
In order to test the effect of voter issue attention on parties’ issue emphasis,
we obtained data on the most important policy issues from the Politbarometer,
which is a representative survey that is carried out monthly among German cit-
izens and includes an open question that asks respondents about the most
important problem (MIP). We matched the most important issues indicated by
respondents with the issue areas identiﬁed by the text analysis and used the
percentage of respondents indicating each issue area as important as a measure
for voter issue attention. As political parties need some time to process voters’
policy priorities, we predict the emphasis that parties place on a policy issue at
t0 (the current month) with the salience of the issue among voters at t‒1 (the
past month).
We operationalise issue ownership of political parties drawing on data on
competence attribution obtained from election studies, which is a commonly
used measure in the literature (see e.g. Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Green and
Hobolt 2008). We combine two questions included in the German election
studies. First, we use the most important problem question included in election
studies to identify the issue priorities of German citizens. Second, we use a fol-
low-up question which asks respondents to report which party is most compe-
tent in dealing with the most important issue in their view. We rely on the
percentage of respondents who indicated that a political party is competent in
dealing with a given issue area as a measure for issue ownership of political
parties.
We furthermore control for a number of possible confounding variables.
First, as issue emphasis might systematically vary over the course of the leg-
islative term, we measure the stage of the electoral cycle by the number of
months until the next national election. Second, we take into account the
impact of state-level elections and European Parliament elections by including
dummy variables indicating whether such an election took place during the
same month. Third, since issue attention might vary systematically between
government and opposition parties, we included a binary measure for opposi-
tion parties. Fourth, as political parties might pay more attention to issues that
they emphasised in their previous election manifesto to signal compliance with
election promises (Thomson 2001), we obtained data on issue salience in par-
ties’ election manifestos from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
(Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP developed a classiﬁca-
tion scheme with 56 categories grouped into seven policy domains. In order to
bring together the press release data with the CMP data, we matched the CMP
categories and the issue areas identiﬁed by the text analysis (see Table A.4 in
the appendix). Altogether, we were able to identify 12 issue areas that were
common to both the quantitative text analysis of parties’ press releases and the
CMP. Manifesto issue salience was measured by the percentage of quasi-
sentences devoted to an issue area in the party manifesto published for the
previous national election.
10 H. Klüver and I. Sagarzazu
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Fifth, as parties’ issue emphasis might furthermore be affected by the
attention that other parties pay to policy issues (Adams and Somer-Topcu
2009; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010), we include a measure for the
lagged attention that government parties paid to a policy issue if the other
party is in opposition and the lagged attention that opposition parties paid to a
policy issue if the other party is in government, respectively (Government/
opposition issue attention). Sixth, as political parties might place greater
emphasis on policy issues which fall into the remits of their ministerial portfo-
lios, we include a dummy variable for ministerial control over the respective
issue area (see Table A.4 for the matching of ministry portfolios and issue
areas). Seventh, in order to control for the state of the economy we include the
unemployment rate in our model. Finally, we control for important focusing
events that might have caused shifts in political communication strategies of
coalition parties, namely the BSE (mad cow disease) crisis, the CDU funding
scandal, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the war in Afghanistan, the devastating
German ﬂood in 2002, the 2006 football world cup in Germany and the
current economic crisis.
Data Analysis
Figure 1 presents the attention that all four analysed parties paid to the issues
of the economy and the environment from 2000 until 2010. Each of the ﬁgures
is subdivided into four graphs, one for each of the four parties in our dataset.
Each graph shows the (smoothed) evolution of attention to the economy
(Figure 1(a)) and to the environment (Figure 1(b)) over time. The three vertical
lines separate the four legislative periods that we analysed in our dataset. The
ﬁrst two periods correspond to the SPD‒Green coalition, the third period to
the grand coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU, and the last period to
the CDU/CSU‒FDP coalition. Figure 1(a) shows that the economy issue
receives on average about 10 per cent of the parties’ attention, with consider-
able variation between the four parties. For instance, the FDP considerably
increased its emphasis on the economy before and during the economic crisis
while the CDU/CSU paid less attention to the economy once in government.
Figure 1(b) moreover demonstrates that German parties pay much less atten-
tion to the environment (under 5 per cent on average) compared to the econ-
omy. It is interesting to note in this ﬁgure that the period in which the SPD
was most attentive to environmental protection was during its ﬁrst coalition
with the Greens.
In order to empirically test our hypotheses while controlling for possible
confounding variables, we next present multivariate regression models. The
observations in our dataset are not independent, as assumed by ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression. On the one hand, the observations are clustered into
four political parties and 12 issue areas. In order to address this problem, we
estimate regression models with clustered robust standard errors that account
for this twofold clustering into political parties and policy issues. On the other
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hand, we analyse party issue attention over time as our observations
correspond to monthly party issue emphasis from 2000 until 2010. This timing
component potentially leads to autocorrelation in the dependent variable. In
order to control for potential autocorrelation, we include the lagged dependent
variable in the regression analyses (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996).
Table 1 presents the results of the time-series cross-section regression anal-
ysis. Model 1 includes the explanatory variables and the various control vari-
ables discussed above. Model 2, moreover, comprises ﬁxed effects for
legislative terms as party issue attention might signiﬁcantly vary across terms
due to varying government and opposition conﬁgurations. Finally, Model 3
includes ﬁxed effects for political parties as issue emphasis might systemati-
cally vary between different types of political parties. Across all three model
(a) Economy (b) Environment
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speciﬁcations, we arrive at the same substantial results. Party issue ownership
does not exhibit a systematic effect on party issue emphasis. The competence
attribution by voters cannot predict the attention that German parties pay to
different policy issues. Hence, the regression analysis does not provide any
empirical support for the issue ownership theory. By contrast, we consistently
ﬁnd across all three models that the salience of political issues to voters at t‒1
has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the attention that parties pay to policy
issues at t0. The greater the salience of an issue to voters in the past month,
the more attention parties pay to this policy issue in the current month. Hence,
the empirical analysis supports the riding the wave argument while refuting the
ownership hypothesis. Parties respond to their voters by emphasising policy
issues that are important to their electorate.
In order to illustrate the effect of voter issue attention on parties’ issue
emphasis, we have simulated predicted values as suggested by King et al.
(2000). Figure 2 shows the predicted party issue attention at t0 as voter issue
attention at t‒1 increases. Figure 2 clearly demonstrates that the attention that
political parties pay to policy issues systematically increases with the salience
of the issues among voters. Across the entire range of observed values of voter
issue attention, an increase in public salience of an issue goes hand in hand
with an increase in party issue emphasis. Political issues that are salient among
voters in the preceding month receive considerably more attention from politi-
cal parties than policy issues that are of little concern to voters. The size of
this effect, while small in absolute terms, is quite signiﬁcant when you com-
pare it to the average attention that parties pay to the different policy issues.
On average, an issue receives 8 per cent of the overall party attention in a
given month. This attention can be almost doubled (ceteris paribus) when the
issue is salient in the public. All in all, a change from minimum to maximum
voter issue attention corresponds to an increase in party issue attention by one
standard deviation.
As one may argue that political parties may not only respond to voters, but
that voters simultaneously take their cues from parties, we performed two
different tests to check whether such a reciprocal relationship is at play. We
ﬁrst conducted a Granger causality test (for a similar procedure, see
e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). The test indicates that voter issue
attention at t‒1 indeed Granger-causes party issue attention at t0 (see Table A.6
in the appendix). However, the Granger causality test does not provide any
empirical support for the reversed relationship. In addition, we have also esti-
mated reversed regression models with voter issue attention as the dependent
variable and the lagged party issue attention as the independent variable to test
the reversed relationship between voters and political parties (see Table A.7 in
the appendix). In line with the results of the Granger causality test, party issue
attention at t‒1 does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on issue salience
to voters at t0. Hence, both checks support the claim that the issue linkage
between voters and political parties is a bottom-up rather than a top down
process. Political parties respond to voters, not the other way around.
Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? 13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 03
:18
 03
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
TABLE 2
CAMPA IGN ROBUSTNESS CHECK REGRESS ION ANALYS I S
DV: Party issue attention (t0) Model 4
Explanatory variables
Campaign period −0.296
(0.37)
Voter issue attention (t‒1) 0.026**
(0.01)
Voter issue attention (t‒1) × Campaign −0.011
(0.01)
Competence attribution (ownership) 0.003
(0.00)
Competence attribution (ownership) × Campaign 0.004
(0.01)
Explanatory variables
Opposition party 0.069
(0.37)
Manifesto issue salience 0.002
(0.04)
Manifesto issue salience × Campaign 0.045
(0.05)
Government/opposition issue attention (t‒1) 0.203***
(0.03)
Ministry control 0.024
(0.28)
No of months until national election −0.000
(0.01)
EP election 0.002
(0.31)
State election 0.005
(0.21)
Unemployment (t‒1) −0.005
(0.10)
BSE crisis −0.001
(0.36)
CDU funding scandal 0.009
(0.24)
9/11 terrorist attacks −0.041
(0.43)
Afghanistan war 0.007
(0.48)
Flood 0.005
(0.97)
World cup 0.011
(0.61)
Economic crisis 0.002
(0.21)
Party issue attention (t‒1) 0.555***
(0.06)
Constant 1.794*
(1.02)
N 6,060
R2 0.5
F 44
LogLik ‒19,290
AIC 38,625.7
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10.
Standard errors in parentheses.
14 H. Klüver and I. Sagarzazu
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 03
:18
 03
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
With regard to the control variables, we essentially only ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant effect of government‒opposition issue attention. In addition to the
positive effect of issue salience among voters on the emphasis that parties
place on different policy issues, parties’ issue attention is affected by the sal-
ience of the issue among government and opposition parties respectively. If
political parties are in opposition, the attention that they pay to policy issues at
t0 is positively affected by the emphasis that government parties paid to this
policy issue at t‒1. Conversely, if political parties are in government, the results
indicate that their issue agenda at t0 responds to the issue priorities of the
opposition at t‒1. Hence, issue emphasis of political parties is not only driven
by the issue priorities of voters, but also by the attention that other parties pay
to policy issues (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen 2010).
As it could be argued that the dynamics of political communication differ
between the heated election campaign period and normal times of political
debate during the legislative term, we furthermore conducted a robustness
check in which we acknowledge these important temporal differences (see
Table 2). We have estimated an additional model that interacts voter issue
attention and issue ownership with a variable indicating whether or not press
releases are published during an election campaign (six months or less before
an election). We did not ﬁnd any systematic effect for the election campaign
dummy or the interactions, while our major ﬁndings remained stable. Hence,
party issue attention can best be explained by the riding the wave theory as
parties respond to voters’ issue priorities both during normal times of political
debate but also during election campaigns.
Conclusion
In order to shed new light on the still contested question of why political par-
ties choose to prioritise some policy issues over others, this study presented
novel empirical evidence. While previous research almost exclusively focused
on parties’ issue attention in election campaigns focusing either on the
American two-party system or concentrating on issue emphasis in election
manifestos of political parties in Europe (e.g. Damore 2005; Klüver and Spoon
2014; Sides 2007; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002;
Spoon and Klüver 2014; Wagner and Meyer 2014), we have provided a novel
analysis of parties’ issue attention throughout the entire electoral cycle. Based
on a quantitative text analysis of more than 40,000 press releases published by
German political parties from 2000 until 2010, we were able to explore the
day-to-day dynamics of issue competition between political parties. While we
do not ﬁnd any evidence for the issue ownership theory, our ﬁndings provide
strong empirical support for the riding the wave theory. Political parties take
their cues from voters and emphasise policy issues that are salient in the minds
of citizens. Hence, issue competition is a bottom-up process in which political
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parties respond to the policy concerns of voters rather than a top-down process
in which parties affect the salience of policy issues to the electorate.
This study makes an important contribution to the literature on party com-
petition as it sheds light on party communication throughout the entire elec-
toral cycle to examine the selective issue emphasis of political parties.
However, our results have to be read with care. We essentially ﬁnd that parties
primarily respond to the issue concerns of voters in their press releases while
issue ownership cannot account for the topics prioritised in press statements.
But at the same time, previous research examining election manifestos has
found considerable evidence for an issue ownership effect (e.g. Green-Pedersen
and Krogstrup 2008; Klüver and Spoon 2014). Thus, in order to understand
the seemingly contradictory evidence one must bear in mind that two different
data sources are analysed. While press releases constitute an important instru-
ment of party communication through which parties interact with voters and
the media on a daily basis, party manifestos are solely drafted every couple of
years in the run-up to general elections. It is therefore reasonable to argue that
it is much more likely that parties respond to voter concerns in press releases
as they publish them daily and can therefore quickly respond to changes in
public opinion. By contrast, drafting election manifestos typically takes several
months if not years and a wide variety of actors within the party are involved
in drafting these platforms. It is therefore more likely that in election
manifestos parties will concentrate on policy issues on which they enjoy a
long-term advantage.
Our results have important implications for understanding the role of par-
ties for political representation (Dalton et al. 2011; Miller and Stokes 1963). It
is frequently argued that political parties become more and more elitist as they
solely pursue their own agenda without taking into account the concerns and
worries of their voters (see e.g. Sides 2007). Against this backdrop, the ﬁnd-
ings of our study draw a positive picture of parties in modern democracies. In
line with the substantive view of representation (Miller and Stokes 1963), we
have shown that parties not only listen to voters during election campaigns
(Klüver and Spoon 2014; Spoon and Klüver 2014, 2015; Wagner and Meyer
2014), but that they constantly monitor public opinion and respond to citizens’
issue priorities throughout the entire legislative term. Political parties are there-
fore not out of touch, but they instead carefully listen to the concerns and the
interests of voters. They aggregate voter concerns and articulate them in the
political sphere by putting them on their issue agenda. Political parties thus
constitute important intermediary organisations that serve as a bridge between
society and political institutions. Parties therefore fulﬁl an important function
in democracies as they link voters with public policy (Dalton et al. 2011).
While our study has shed important light on why parties choose to talk
about some issues and not about others, much remains to be done. First, this
study focused on selective issue emphasis of political parties in Germany.
While Germany is an important political system which shares many similarities
with other political systems, future research should extend the study of parties’
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issue attention to other political systems. Second, while this study has offered
a novel perspective on party issue competition by providing an analysis of
selective issue emphasis across the entire electoral cycle to shed light on the
day-to-day dynamics of parties’ issue attention, future research should system-
atically theorise and analyse how the electoral cycle conditions the selective
issue emphasis of political parties. Finally, future research should investigate
how party characteristics affect the selective issue emphasis of political parties.
For instance, niche parties are typically considered to be more rigid in their
policy goals than mainstream parties as the latter prioritise ofﬁce over policy
goals (Adams et al. 2006; Klüver and Spoon 2014). As a result, it would be
interesting to explore whether niche parties tend to emphasise policy issues
that they own while mainstream parties tend to highlight issues that are salient
to voters in a more extensive comparative analysis.
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